Howe

With this publication, Pew updates to 2017 its in-depth "Religious Landscape Studies" that provided estimates of America's religious beliefs and practices in 2007 and 2014. (See also "Nones Rising.")

There are no bombshell revelations here. Just a straight-line continuation of the secularizing trends already registered in Pew's earlier studies and in the long-running General Social Survey. In 2014, 47% of Americans identified as Protestant. In 2018-19, that is down to 43%. The share identifying as Catholic declined slightly from 21% to 20%. The "nothing in particular" share rose from 16% to 17%. And the agnostic-plus-atheist share rose from 7% to 9%. The percent of U.S. adults who say they attend religious service "monthly or more" fell from 50% in 2014 to 45% on 2018-19. Meanwhile, the percent who say they attend "a few times a year or less" grew from 50% to 54%. See the first two charts below.

As it did in its earlier studies, Pew points out that some of this decline probably comes from noncommittal or "moderate" Christians (who never went to church very often) becoming more open about admitting they are unaffiliated. This explains the larger-than-average declines in Protestants. It also explains why church attendance has hardly dropped at all among Americans who still claim to be Christian--and why the "born again" share of Protestants has actually been rising slightly over time.

Yet most of this measured decline undoubtedly reflects real changes in belief and behavior. As we pointed out in an earlier NewsWire (see "Rise of the Religious 'Nones'"), these changes can be decomposed into period effects (changes that appear in everyone at all ages in the same year) and cohort effects (changes that "age in" with new birth cohorts over time).

The period effects are significant. Starting in the early 1990s, after many decades of relative stability, most measures of religiosity have declined across all age groups. This decline slowed a bit in the early '00s (around the time of 9/11), but otherwise has been pretty much a straight line. Let me quote from our earlier piece: "Among the period drivers, one big one is declining public trust in churches and church leaders due to widely publicized scandals and abuses. This decline has been especially steep among liberals disaffected by churches that have allied themselves with social conservatives and the Republican Party. As a result, America's red-versus-blue political divide now encompasses religion (see Robert Putnam et al., American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us)--which tempts some Democratic leaders to abandon their religious voters."

Yet there are also strong generational drivers. The evidence suggests that Boomers, Xers, and Millennials are each becoming increasingly less religious (at the same age) than the three generations before them. Since 2007, for example, the current Pew study shows the smallest age-bracket decline for the Silent, a larger decline for Boomers and Xers, and a very large decline for Millennials. See the third and fourth charts below.

Even among Millennials, late-wavers (born in the 1990s) appear to be less religious than early-wavers (born in the 1980s), although some of this may be caused by a progressively later age of marriage and childbearing. (Marriage and children are well-known "life cycle" triggers of greater religiosity.) The unaffiliateds' median age is 36, ten years younger than the national median age. Millennials are left-brained achievers who hold science and technology in high regard. Clearly, many of these thirtyish young adults want to break from what they perceive to be the faith-based, born-again dogmas of their Boomer parents.

Since we have a national election coming up, let's return to the topic of religion by political party. Among Democratic-leaning voters, 34% are now religiously unaffiliated and 61% go to church a few times a year or less. Among Republican-leaning voters, the numbers are 16% and 45%, respectively. A lot of this is driven by ideological self-selection according to how each party aligns itself on values issues. Generationally, the split manifests itself in the disproportionate shares of Millennials and late-wave Xers leaning to the Democrats, and of Silent and Boomers leaning to the Republicans.

Yet religion is also becoming a real challenge for the Democrats due to a widening split between, on the one hand, their cutting-edge cultural progressives and, on the other, their large African-American and Hispanic constituencies. The former tend to be much less religiously affiliated than other Americans. (Indeed, many are agnostics or atheists--who in turn are disproportionately high-education and high-income single whites.) The latter tend to be much more religiously affiliated than other Americans. Consider that, in 2018-19, 61% of African-American Democrats (and 49% of Hispanic Democrats) go to church at least monthly--versus 29% of white Democrats. And 74% of black Democrats consider themselves Christian--versus 47% of white Democrats. See last two charts below.

In recent years, most of America has been moving left when it comes to economic issues (see "Public Leaning Much More to the Left"). But the same is not true when it comes to social and religious values--despite America's growing indifference to church membership and church attendance. By very large majorities, most Americans continue to believe that churches "strengthen community bonds" (89%), "play an important role in helping the poor" (87%), and "protect and strengthen morality in society" (75%). This probably explains why African-American and Hispanic Democrats are nearly twenty percentage points less likely to self-identify as "liberal" than white Democrats. This gap has more than doubled over the past 15 years.

Back in the 2016 primaries, Hillary Clinton knew how to use biblical cadences and faith-based parables to win over black audiences in southern states. Bernie Sanders was (and is) largely tone-deaf on religion and race. Which is why Bernie lost those states and hence the nomination. Yet in 2020 the two candidates now rising in the polls and getting the bulk of the positive media--Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg--poll even worse among African Americans and Hispanics than Bernie Sanders does. Joe Biden does a bit better among African Americans, but not among Hispanics.

Yes, there are candidates who do relatively better with minorities. But none of them (Kamala Harris, Cory Booker, Julian Castro, Beto O'Rourke) seem to be going anywhere in the national polls.